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Abstract
A number of academic studies have sought to comparatively analyse the French riots of 2005 
with those that occurred in England in 2011, yet these have been limited in their scope and depth. 
In this article, we set out a more comprehensive analysis of the causes and underlying meaning of 
these episodes of collective disorder through a systematic application of the Flashpoints Model 
RI3XEOLF'LVRUGHU WRHDFKFDVH7KHDUJXPHQW LGHQWLÀHVDQGFRQVLGHUVSRLQWVRIRYHUODSDQG
tension between the various causal factors underpinning the respective riots, engaging with 
ERWKWKHEDFNJURXQGFDXVHVORQJDQGVKRUWWHUPDQGWKH¶WULJJHULQJ·HYHQWWKDWSURPSWHGD
latent potential for violence to become manifest as rioting. In addition to providing an analytical 
framework for the comparative study of these important episodes of rioting, the article constitutes 
D UHVSRQVH WR UHFHQW FULWLFLVPV UHJDUGLQJ WKH H[SODQDWRU\ VFRSHRI WKHÁDVKSRLQWVPRGHO DQG
demonstrates the continued relevance of the model as a robust conceptual framework within 
which the anatomy of collective disorder can be dissected and understood.
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Focus and objectives
Several earlier publications by the second author and his colleagues have highlighted H[SODQDWRU\ VLPLODULWLHV DQG GLIIHUHQFHV LQ WKH XQGHUO\LQJ FDXVHV PRWLYHV DQG ¶SROLWLFDO
PHDQLQJV·RIWKH)UHQFKULRWVRIDQGWKHLUFRXQWHUSDUWVRFFXUULQJLQWKH8.LQ
DQG  :DGGLQJWRQ  D:DGGLQJWRQ HW DO :DGGLQJWRQ DQG.LQJ 
2012). The current paper seeks to complement and enhance the insights deriving from these 
studies by conducting a similar analytical comparison of the French riots and those taking place 
in England in August 2011, both of which originated from the deaths of ethnic minority youths 
HQJDJHG LQ HQFRXQWHUVZLWKSROLFHRIÀFHUV LQGLVWULFWVRI3DULV DQG/RQGRQ UHVSHFWLYHO\ EXW
quickly extended into other major towns and cities nationwide.
The now-familiar trigger that ignited the three weeks of rioting in France from late October 
WKURXJK1RYHPEHUZDVRQHRIWKRVHVHHPLQJO\¶EDQDOFRQIURQWDWLRQV·%URZQWKDW
characterise interactions between police and local youths in the Parisian suburbs. On 27 October, 
police responding to information regarding a potential break-in at a local construction site tried 
to intercept a group of nine local youths. Six of them were apprehended almost immediately, 
but three others (17-year-old Zyed Benna, 15-year-old Bouna Traoré, and 17-year-old Muhittin 
Altun), who were all of immigrant origins, tried to escape by hiding on the site of a power sub-
station. Their efforts to evade police had disastrous consequences: Zyed and Bouna were fatally 
electrocuted while Muhittin sustained serious injuries (Moran, 2012).
News of this incident swiftly circulated in the neighbourhood, provoking a highly destructive 
WZRKRXU ¶UDPSDJH· LQZKLFK VRPH  ORFDO \RXWKVZUHDNHG KDYRF E\ LQÁLFWLQJ GDPDJH RQ
SXEOLFEXLOGLQJVDQGVHWWLQJÀUHVWRWZRGR]HQFDUV%URZQRSFLW$IWHUWZRIXUWKHUQLJKWV
of intermittent local rioting, similar disorders (an estimated 200 in all) rapidly started to spread 
beyond Paris into the suburban areas of other major French cities, such as Lyon, Toulouse, Nancy 
and Pau. During the ensuing 20-day period of violence, the police looked on virtually helplessly 
DVDQHVWLPDWHGFDUVZHUHULWXDOLVWLFDOO\EXUQHGZLWKEHLQJVHWDOLJKWRQWKHHYHQLQJ
of 8 November alone (ibid.). The total cost of the resulting urban destruction was subsequently 
put at €200 million. Of the 5,200 people arrested for allegedly taking part in the riots, 600 were 
eventually imprisoned (Mucchielli, 2009). 
7KH(QJOLVK ULRWVRI ZHUH ¶VSDUNHG· LQ D VLPLODU IDVKLRQ WR WKH)UHQFKGLVRUGHUVRI
+HUHWRRDSROLFHUHODWHGNLOOLQJLQZKLFK0DUN'XJJDQD\HDUROGPDQRI$IULFDQ
&DULEEHDQ RULJLQV ZDV VKRW GHDG ZKLOH EHLQJ SXUVXHG E\ RIÀFHUV LQ WKH 7RWWHQKDP DUHD RI
QRUWK/RQGRQLQWKHHDUO\HYHQLQJRI$XJXVWZDVSLYRWDOWRWKHZLGHUFRQÁLFW7KHRIÀFHUV
LQYROYHG LQWKLV LQFLGHQWIRUPHGSDUWRI WKH0HWURSROLWDQ3ROLFH6HUYLFH·V 036·V ¶2SHUDWLRQ
7ULGHQW·DVSHFLDOLVWXQLWUHVSRQVLEOHIRUWDFNOLQJ¶JXQFULPHV·LQ/RQGRQ·VEODFNFRPPXQLWLHV
When the incident took place, members of this unit had been following Mr Duggan as he made 
his way back to his home at the local Broadwater Farm estate, evidently with the intention of 
arresting him. Initial press reports of the incident claimed that Duggan was a well-known local 
¶JDQJVWHU·DQGWKDWKLVNLOOLQJKDGRFFXUUHGLQWKHFRQWH[WRIDÀHUFHO\FRQWHVWHGVKRRWRXW5LRWV
&RPPXQLWLHVDQG9LFWLPV3DQHO²DYLHZGLVPLVVHGE\ODUJHVHFWLRQVRIWKH%URDGZDWHU
Farm community, who strongly suspected that the police were covering up a serious instance of 
wrongdoing (Reicher and Stott, 2011). 
Two days after the Duggan shooting, a crowd of 200 protesters, consisting mainly of women 
and children, marched through the Broadwater Farm estate and gathered outside the Tottenham 
Court Road police station to demand further details of the circumstances of his death. The two-
hour protest remained largely peaceful, but shortly after most of those present had dispersed, 
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rioting broke out between young people and police. The riots were initially limited to the local 
DUHD EXW WKH\ VRRQ VSUHDGRYHU WKH FRXUVHRI WKHQH[W IRXU GD\V ² LQLWLDOO\ WR D GR]HQPRUH
locations in the capital, and thereafter, to over sixty other towns and cities nationwide, including 
parts of Birmingham and Manchester (Riots Communities and Victims Panel, 2011).  It was later 
UHSRUWHGWKDWÀYHFLYLOLDQVZHUHNLOOHGDVDUHVXOWRIWKHULRWLQJDQGWKDWRIWKHVHYHUDOKXQGUHG
LQMXUHGZHUHSROLFHRIÀFHUV 2IÀFLDOHVWLPDWHVSXWWKHQXPEHURISHRSOH LQYROYHGLQWKH
ULRWLQJDWVRPHZKHUHEHWZHHQDQG2IWKHVHVRPHSHRSOHZHUHDUUHVWHGIRU
their alleged part in the disorder (ibid.).
3UHYLRXVDWWHPSWVWRFRPSDUDWLYHO\DQDO\VHWKH)UHQFKDQGPRVWUHFHQW8.ULRWVKDYHEHHQ
XQGHUWDNHQE\%RG\*HQGURW  DQG6XWWHUOW\ 7KHSUHVHQW VWXG\DLPV WR VHWRXW
a more comprehensive analysis of the underlying meanings and motives of these riots via a 
systematic application in each case of the Flashpoints Model of Public Disorder (e.g. Waddington, 
1992, 2007, 2010b; Waddington et al., 1989). In addition to providing an analytical framework 
for the comparative study of these important episodes of rioting, these extensive applications of 
WKHÁDVKSRLQWVPRGHOFRQVWLWXWHDUHVSRQVHWRFULWLFLVPQRWDEO\E\2WWHQHWDOWKDWLW
GRHVQRWSURYLGHVXIÀFLHQWLQVLJKWLQWRULRWSURFHVVHVDQGG\QDPLFVRFFXUULQJEH\RQGWKHLQLWLDO
RXWEUHDNRIGLVRUGHULHLWV¶ÁDVKSRLQW·RUWULJJHULQJLQFLGHQW
)UDPHZRUNRI$QDO\VLV7KH)ODVKSRLQWV0RGHORI3XEOLF'LVRUGHU
In a highly relevant essay which focuses on the possible political motives of the English 
GLVRUGHUV$QJHOSUHPDUNVWKDWWKHGLVWLQFWLRQ¶EHWZHHQWKHGUDPDWLF´WULJJHUµHYHQW
and the underlying social, economic or political conditions that make the subsequent chain of 
HYHQWVPRUHOLNHO\LVDQLPSRUWDQWRQHLQXQGHUVWDQGLQJWKH8.ULRWVRI·7KLVREVHUYDWLRQ
is echoed in the following attempt to use the Flashpoints Model of Public Disorder as the basis 
of a fully rounded appreciation of the underlying political motives and meanings, not only of the 
English riots, but also of the preceding French disturbances of 2005.
7KHÁDVKSRLQWVPRGHODWWDFKHVJUHDWVLJQLÀFDQFHWRWKRVHKLJKO\HPRWLYHWULJJHULQJLQFLGHQWV
¶ÁDVKSRLQWV· WKDW LQYDULDEO\VHUYHDVWKHFDWDO\VWVIRUZLGHUGLVRUGHU7KHPRGHOSUHVXSSRVHV
WKDW LQ RUGHU WR DSSUHFLDWH WKH IXOO V\PEROLF VLJQLÀFDQFH RI VXFK LQFLGHQWV DQG WKH SDQRSO\
of emotions and behaviours they induce, it is necessary to examine the full range of relevant 
variables existing at seven key levels of analysis: structural, cultural, institutional/organisational, political/
ideological, contextual, situational and interactional (e.g. Waddington, 1992, 2010a; Waddington et al., 
1989).
The structural level is concerned with those conditions affecting particular sections of 
VRFLHW\HJPDWHULDOLQHTXDOLWLHVSROLWLFDOSRZHUOHVVQHVVDQGLQIHULRU¶OLIHFKDQFHV·ZKLFKLQGXFH
collective sensations of grievance and disaffection.  Strongly related to such patterns are those 
aspects of group culture (i.e. systems of value and belief, ways of life and repertoires of action) that 
HQDEOHWKHSHRSOHFRQFHUQHG²VXFKDVHWKQLFPLQRULW\\RXWKV²WRFRSHZLWKDQGPDNHVHQVH
of whatever social worlds they inhabit. This emphasis on group culture also extends to relevant 
features of the police occupational culture, such as the everyday stereotypes and recipes of action 
ZKLFKHQDEOHWKHPWRFDUU\RXWDQGMXVWLI\WKHLUUROH7KLVWLHVLQLQWXUQZLWKSRVVLEOHLQÁXHQFHV
on police behaviour existing at the institutional/organisational level, such as national (and/or or 
local) traditions of policing, bureaucratic structures, systems of accountability, training regimes 
or standard operating procedures, which may have a bearing on public order strategy or tactics.
The political/ideological level focuses on the ways in which key political ideological institutions 
(e.g. the government, political parties, lobby groups, the police and mass media) respond to the 
&ǈǇǍƾǇǍǂǈǇ9ǈǅǑ,ǌǌǎƾǑ;ǑǑǑǑɢɠɡǑ
lifestyles and political demands of culturally or politically dissenting groups and their chosen 
ways of representing their claims, objectives and/or identities. These processes are fundamental 
to explaining the tolerance or severity with which the police may choose to deal with the group 
in question, as well as the latter’s readiness to engage in violence and disruption as ways of getting 
their claims and grievances across.
The contextual level of analysis incorporates a wide range of communication processes, such 
as rumours of police atrocities, media sensitisation to the prospect of violent confrontation, 
D QHJDWLYH KLVWRU\ RI SROLFHFRPPXQLW\ FRQÁLFW DQG D UHFHQW EXLOGXS DQG GLVFXVVLRQ RI
aggressive encounters between police and local residents, which are likely to have an emotionally 
arousing effect. This is not to be confused with the situational level, which is more concerned 
with the immediate physical or spatial setting in which actual or potential violence may occur. 
7KLV OHYHO LV FOHDUO\ XQGHUSLQQHG E\ DQ LPSRUWDQW VXEMHFWLYH GLPHQVLRQ ² H[HPSOLÀHG E\ WKH
UHFRJQLWLRQWKDWSDUWLFXODUORFDWLRQVPD\EHLPEXHGZLWKVSHFLDOV\PEROLFRUFXOWXUDOVLJQLÀFDQFH
DQ H[DPSOH KHUHZRXOG EH D VHFWLRQ RI ¶WXUI· WR EH WDNHQ E\ WKH SROLFH RU GHIHQGHG E\ ORFDO
\RXWKV0RUHRYHUWKHVHV\PEROLFDOO\VLJQLÀFDQWORFDWLRQVPD\FRQWDLQRUUHYROYHDURXQGVSHFLÀF
¶WDUJHWVRIGHULVLRQ·VXFKDVDQRWRULRXVORFDOSROLFHVWDWLRQWKDWFDQERWKLQFUHDVHWKHSRWHQWLDO
for disorder and serve as focal points for violence once the riot has begun.
As its name suggests, the interactional level relates to the nature and consequences of 
interpersonal and intergroup interaction between the police and relevant civilians.  The quality 
RIVXFKLQWHUDFWLRQZLOOLQHYLWDEO\EHLQÁXHQFHGE\WKHSUHGLVSRVLQJHIIHFWRIYDULDEOHVORFDWHG
at the preceding levels of analysis. Such variables will also have a great bearing on the meaning 
DWWDFKHGWRDQ\DFWXDORUSRWHQWLDOO\ WULJJHULQJ LQFLGHQWV ¶ÁDVKSRLQWV·DQG WKHHQVXLQJVRFLDO
UHDFWLRQ7KHVLJQLÀFDQFHRIVXFKÁDVKSRLQWVOLHVLQWKHLUFDSDFLW\WRV\PEROLVHDQXQZLOOLQJQHVV
by the police and/or civilians to accommodate their opponents’ rights or objectives, or represent 
DVHHPLQJO\GHOLEHUDWHWUDQVJUHVVLRQRIDWDFLWO\DJUHHGFRGHRISHUPLVVLEOHEHKDYLRXURU¶SDWWHUQ
RIDFFRPPRGDWLRQ·7KLV¶RYHUVWHSSLQJRIWKHPDUN·LVOLDEOHWRSURYHHYHQPRUHSUHFLSLWRXVLQ
WKHSUHVHQFHRI¶LQWHQVLÀHUV·²LHFKDUDFWHULVWLFVRIWKHLQGLYLGXDOVLQYROYHGHJDKLJKUDQNLQJ
SROLFHRIÀFHURU¶YXOQHUDEOH·SHUVRQVXFKDVDZRPDQHOGHUO\SHUVRQRUFKLOGRURIWKHDFWLYLW\
itself (e.g. an especially rough or degrading arrest).  
7KHÁDVKSRLQWVPRGHOKDVEHHQVXEMHFWHGWRDSHQHWUDWLQJDQGXVHIXOFULWLTXHE\2WWHQHW
al. (2001). The criticism by these authors that the model adds little to our understanding of the 
SRVWÁDVKSRLQWGHYHORSPHQWRIDQ\SDUWLFXODUULRWZKDWWKH\UHIHUWRDVWKH¶RQVHW·SKDVHLVQRW
entirelyMXVWLÀHG,QNHHSLQJZLWKWKHZRUNRI5HLFKHUDQGKLVFROOHDJXHVHJ'UXU\DQG5HLFKHU
2000), the model maintains that police interventions of this kind may unwittingly succeed only 
in unifying the crowd against them and drawing in the previously non-partisan (i.e. inducing a 
¶E\VWDQGHUHIIHFW·7KHSRWHQWLDOPD\VWLOOH[LVWDWWKLVSRLQWIRUWKHFRQIURQWDWLRQWREHUHYHUVHG
YLDWKHLPSOHPHQWDWLRQRI¶SDFLÀHUV·²DFWVRIUHSDUDWLRQVXFKDVWKHUHOHDVLQJRIDSULVRQHURU
intervention of a credible intermediary. Nevertheless:
Should confrontation continue unabated, the targeting of people or property will vary 
ERWK LQIRUPDQGVHYHULW\EXWZLOOXOWLPDWHO\UHPDLQ ¶PHDQLQJIXO· LQUHVSHFWRIIDFWRUV
residing at the previous levels of analysis. The characteristic sentiments and emotions of 
the rioters (e.g. power, elation, liberation and revenge) will likewise be interpretable with 
UHJDUGWRWKHVSHFLÀFJULHYDQFHVKHOGE\DGLVVHQWLQJJURXSWKHLUSROLWLFDOPDUJLQDOLW\DQG
WKHLUUHFHQWH[SRVXUHWRRSSUHVVLYHIRUPVRISROLFLQJ:DGGLQJWRQES
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Otten et al. undoubtedly have a strong case, however, in asserting that the model does not 
say enough about the communication processes involved in the mobilisation of riot participants 
EH\RQGWKHÁDVKSRLQWVLQFLGHQW7KH\DUHHTXDOO\FRUUHFWLQPDLQWDLQLQJWKDWWKHUHDUHNQRZQ
LQVWDQFHVRI ULRWLQJ LQZKLFKQRWRQHEXW VHYHUDOÁDVKSRLQWVRFFXU  VRPHWLPHV DWGLIIHULQJ
ORFDWLRQVDQGVHSDUDWHSRLQWV LQ WLPHPDNLQJ LW MXVWLÀDEOH WRUHIHU WRDFROOHFWLRQRI ¶PLQL·RU
¶VDWHOOLWH·ULRWVHDFKZLWKWKHFDSDFLW\WR¶FUHDWHWKHLURZQOLWWOHKLVWRU\GXULQJWKHFRXUVHRIWKH
day’ (ibid., p. 21).    
)ROORZLQJRXUHDUOLHUDWWHPSWVWRDGGUHVVWKHVHREVHUYDWLRQV:DGGLQJWRQDQG.LQJ
the model is more explicit now in asserting that the escalation of major disorders beyond the 
ÁDVKSRLQW LWVHOI LVDFRQVHTXHQFHRIPRELOLVDWLRQUHVXOWLQJQRWRQO\IURPZRUGRIPRXWKEXW
DOVRIURPWKHDFWLYDWLRQRIVRFLDOPHGLDDQGRWKHUIRUPVRIPDVVFRPPXQLFDWLRQ.RWURQDNLDQG
Seferiades, 2012). The model assumes that these processes not only have the capacity to promote 
DQGMXVWLI\WKHH[SDQVLRQDQGLQWHQVLÀFDWLRQRIFRQÁLFWDQGGHVWUXFWLRQEXWDOVRWRIXUWKHUXQLI\
and embolden the participants, especially in cases where the police are outnumbered or perceived 
to be lacking in resolve (Drury and Reicher, op. cit.). It also presupposes that corresponding 
behavioural and communicative interventions by the police or other intermediaries (or failures to 
intervene in circumstances where such action might be warranted) can impact at our interactional 
DQG FRQWH[WXDO OHYHOV UHVSHFWLYHO\ LQ VXFKZD\V DV WR H[DFHUEDWH RU SDFLI\ WKH FRQÁLFW 7KLV
potential will be most apparent in cases where interventions of this nature are imbued with 
DGGLWLRQDOVLJQLÀFDQFHUHODWLQJWRRQHRUPRUHRIRXUUHPDLQLQJOHYHOVRIDQDO\VLV
The model’s potential to provide an exhaustive explanatory framework for both of the 
HSLVRGHV RI ULRWLQJ LQ TXHVWLRQ LV DSSDUHQW LQ D UHFHQW VWXG\E\ 6XWWHUOW\ ZKRVH ¶ÀYH
SDUDOOHOV·EHWZHHQWKHGLVRUGHUVLQ)UDQFHDQG(QJODQGQDPHO\WKHLUH[WUHPHO\VLPLODU¶WULJJHUV
RI XQUHVW· WKH UHFHQW WUDGLWLRQV RI ULRWLQJ LQ HDFK FRXQWU\ WKHLU ¶VKDUHG VRFLDO VWUXFWXUDO
FKDUDFWHULVWLFV·RISRYHUW\DQGLQIHULRUOLIHFKDQFHVWKHSUHVHQFHRI¶VWLJPDWL]LQJGLVFRXUVHVDERXW
the disadvantaged’, and police work and security policies marked by unwarranted and discriminatory 
intervention) strongly allude to variables embodied in the model.  
An even more explicit endorsement of the model’s potential is provided by Body-Gendrot 
ZKRDSSODXGV LWVFDSDFLW\ WRDFFXUDWHO\ LGHQWLI\DUDQJHRI ¶H[SODQDWRU\GLPHQVLRQV·RI
UHOHYDQFHWRHDFKFRXQWU\¶HFRQRPLFKDUGVKLSODFNRIOLIHFKDQFHVSROLWLFDOGLVHQIUDQFKLVHPHQW
police-youth tensions, rumours, street cultures and territorial contests’). Indeed Body-Gendrot 
GUDZVH[SOLFLWO\RQHOHPHQWVRIWKHÁDVKSRLQWVPRGHOWKHLGHDRID¶WULJJHULQJRUSUHFLSLWDWLQJ
HYHQW·LQKHURZQIRXUVWDJH¶LQWHUDFWLYHIUDPHZRUN·0RUHRYHUZKLOHWKHVFRSHRIKHUVWXG\LV
largely limited to issues of socioeconomic exclusion and deprivation, the analysis does hint at the 
LPSRUWDQFHRIRWKHUIDFWRUVKLJKOLJKWHGLQWKHÁDVKSRLQWVPRGHOVXFKDVSROLFHSXEOLFUHODWLRQV
and the role of group values, beliefs and identities. 
+DYLQJHVWDEOLVKHGWKHQDWXUHDQGYDOXHRIWKHÁDVKSRLQWVPRGHODVDQDQDO\WLFDOIUDPHZRUN
it will now be applied to the French riots of 2005 and the English riots of 2011. In each case, the 
analysis will be presented in two parts: a discussion of the conditions forming the background 
to the disorder will be followed by consideration of the trigger and subsequent escalation of the 
violence. This systematic approach will allow for a more structured and nuanced understanding 
of the commonalities underpinning these major episodes of collective disorder. 
&ǈǇǍƾǇǍǂǈǇ9ǈǅǑ,ǌǌǎƾǑ;ǑǑǑǑɢɠɡǑ
French riots of 2005
%DFNJURXQGFRQGLWLRQV
6XWWHUW\ LV XQGRXEWHGO\ ZHOOMXVWLÀHG LQ SRLQWLQJ WR NH\ SUHGLVSRVLQJ FRQGLWLRQV DW WKH
VWUXFWXUDOOHYHORIWKHÁDVKSRLQWVPRGHODVFDXVDOIDFWRUVLQWKHULRWLQJWKDWWRRNSODFHLQ)UDQFH
The relevant set of circumstances have their origins in the highly successful post-war French 
HFRQRPLF UHMXYHQDWLRQRI WRZKLFKRZHGPXFK WR WKH FRQWULEXWLRQRI WKH WHQVRI
thousands of northern and sub-Saharan African workers who were recruited from the former 
French colonies.  As temporary workers became permanent settlers, France was faced with an 
acute housing crisis. The response to this crisis came in the form of an urban policy that located 
these workers and their families on out-of-town high-rise housing complexes, which progressively 
became concentrations of the most underprivileged members of French society. The population 
of the banlieues became socially and economically excluded, and poor transport provision only 
helped to reinforce their physical, as well as psychological segregation (Oberti, 2008). It is in this 
prolonged period of social, cultural and economic decline that the problems that characterise the 
contemporary French suburbs are rooted.
7KHRQVHW RI WKH WZHQW\ÀUVW FHQWXU\ EURXJKWZLWK LW DZRUOGZLGH HFRQRPLF GRZQWXUQ
resulting in widespread deindustrialisation and the impoverishing and demoralising effect of a 
\RXWKXQHPSOR\PHQWUDWHZKLFKDYHUDJHGLQWKH)UHQFKFLWpVDQGZDVDVKLJKDVLQ
VRPHRIWKHPRVWEDGO\KLW¶KRWVSRWV·RIPDMRUFLWLHVOLNH3DULV6LOYHUVWHLQDQG7HWUHDXOW
The employment prospects of male ethnic minority youths were further handicapped by poor 
school provision, correspondingly low academic attainment (including an annual drop-out rate of 
DQGSDWWHUQVRIHPSOR\PHQWGLVFULPLQDWLRQWKDWZHUHLQVHSDUDEOHIURPWKHVWLJPDWL]DWLRQ
of the housing projects (Mucchielli, 2009).
Many local youths have culturally adapted to these adverse conditions and their perceived lack 
RISROLWLFDOUHSUHVHQWDWLRQLELGE\DGRSWLQJWKH¶JDQJVWD·VHQVLELOLWLHVUHGROHQWRIXUEDQ$IULFDQ
$PHULFDQ\RXWKVWUHHWFXOWXUH$PRQJWKHLUPRUHQRWDEOH¶VXUYLYDOVWUDWHJLHV·DUHSURSHQVLWLHV
towards drug dealing, petty delinquency, toughness, intense solidarity and a territorial attitude 
involving the sanctity of the immediate neighbourhood (Roy, 2005). Problematically, the French 
banlieuesKDYHDOVREHHQLQFUHDVLQJO\GHSLFWHGE\WKHPDVVPHGLDDQGRWKHUSULPDU\GHÀQHUVQRW
RQO\DVKRWEHGVRI\RXWKFULPLQDOLW\EXWDVSRVVLEOHEUHHGLQJDQGUHFUXLWLQJJURXQGVIRU¶,VODPLF
fundamentalism’:
)URP WKHVRQZDUGV WKH WHUP ¶EHXU·EHFDPH LQFUHDVLQJO\ DVVRFLDWHGZLWK ,VODPLVW
fundamentalism and terrorism and its use became almost exclusively pejorative. 
Newspapers spoke of the banliuesDVDVRXUFHRI¶OLWWOHEHXUVROGLHUV·DQG¶VXLFLGHERPEHUV·
for Islamist fanatics, with the result that young beurs in particular came to be seen as a 
GDQJHURXV¶HQHP\ZLWKLQ·6XWWHUOW\S
The French police have responded to such characterisations with increasing levels of 
repression and militarization, including the deployment of surveillance teams, plain-clothed 
RIÀFHUVDQGULRWSROLFH%RQHOOL)ROORZLQJWKH)UHQFKJHQHUDOHOHFWLRQRIWKHQHZ
Minister of the Interior (Nicolas Sarkozy) withdrew existing community policing programmes 
LQIDYRXURIFUDFNLQJGRZQRQ¶TXDOLW\RI OLIH·FULPHVVXFKDVDJJUHVVLYHEHJJLQJ ORLWHULQJ LQ
hallways and riding without paying on public transport. The infamous controles d’identites, long a 
source of tension in the banlieues, became more frequent and insults and provocation became part 
of daily life as police sought to disperse gatherings of young people and impose their authority 
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¶RQWKHVWUHHW·0RUDQ6FKQHLGHU
The interplay of institutional/organisational, cultural and situational factors becomes 
particularly relevant here. Mouhanna  (2009) emphasises how the French national police policy 
RI GHSOR\LQJ SROLFH RIÀFHUV YLD D FHQWUDOLVHG DXWKRULW\ LQWR ORFDOLWLHV WKDW DUH VRPH GLVWDQFH
removed (both geographically and culturally) from their places of origin has been detrimental to 
SROLFHFLYLOLDQUHODWLRQV6XFKRIÀFHUVDUHUHTXLUHGWRVHUYHIRUWZR\HDUVLQQRWRULRXVO\¶GLIÀFXOW·
neighbourhoods (invariably, the banlieues) as a precondition for a less demanding assignment 
elsewhere. The implication of all this is that the banlieues are being repressively patrolled by 
RIÀFHUVODFNLQJDQ\VHQVLWLYLW\WRORFDOFXOWXUDOVHQVLELOLWLHVDQGZLWKQRLQFHQWLYHWRFXOWLYDWHD
positive long term relationship with local residents. Not surprisingly, situations have developed 
LQZKLFKWKHQHLJKERXUKRRGVFRQFHUQHGDUHVHHQRQWKHRQHKDQGDVSRWHQWLDO¶QRJRDUHDV·WR
be repressively controlled; and on the other as territories to be defended against an unwanted and 
illegitimate army of occupation (Roy, op. cit.). 
Against this longstanding backdrop of tense police-public relations and anti-police sentiment, 
DQXPEHURIFRQWH[WXDOIDFWRUVDVVXPHFRQVLGHUDEOHVLJQLÀFDQFH,WKDVEHHQZLGHO\DUJXHGWKDW
a succession of controversial statements by the then Minister of the Interior Nicolas Sarkozy 
contributed to the eventual rioting of October/November 2005 (Body-Gendrot, op. cit.; Jobard, 
2008; Mucchielli, 2006). In the summer before the rioting occurred, Mr Sarkozy paid a visit to a 
north Parisian housing estate on which, one day earlier, an 11-year-old boy had been accidentally 
VKRWGHDGLQFURVVÀUHEHWZHHQORFDOJDQJV5HÁHFWLQJWKHXQFRPSURPLVLQJDWWLWXGHZLWKZKLFK
KHZDVLQFUHDVLQJO\EHFRPLQJDVVRFLDWHG6DUNR]\PDGHDSURPLVHWRORFDOUHVLGHQWVWKDW¶7KH
ORXWVZLOOGLVDSSHDU:HZLOOFOHDQWKLVHVWDWHZLWKD.DUFKHU·*RGR\²DKLJK²SUHVVXUH
hose used for removing caked-on grime from cars or buildings.  
It is possible that these sentiments may have been germane to the events that subsequently 
arose when the Minister for the Interior visited a similar estate in Agenteuil on 25 October, 
a mere two days before the rioting broke out.  An 8 o’clock news report of the day’s events 
shows Mr Sarkozy walking down the estate’s main thoroughfare, under the protective gaze of a 
VXUURXQGLQJWHDPRISROLFHRIÀFHUV+RZHYHUWKHFDPHUDVXGGHQO\SDQVRXWWRUHYHDODPRUH
troublesome state of affairs:
$ORQJWKHVWUHHWWKURQJVRIDJLWDWHG\RXWKVFKDQWLQXQLVRQ¶6DUNRRQW·HQFXOH6DUNR
RQ W·HQFXOH· ¶6DUNR XS \RXUV· 7KHQ WKH FDPHUD MHUNV WR UHIRFXV RQ WKH0LQLVWHU RI
the Interior as he ducks to avoid something. The news commentator explains that angry 
young people are throwing rocks and other objects at him. Aides rush to Sarkozy’s side, 
SURWHFWLQJKLVKHDGÀUVWZLWKDEULHIFDVH WKHQDQXPEUHOOD  ,Q WKHQH[W VFHQHSROLFH
RIÀFHUVVFDQWKHFURZG¶2YHUKHUH·RQH\HOOVLQWRDZDONLHWDONLHZKLOHSRLQWLQJDWDJURXS
RIKRRGHGDGROHVFHQWVÁHHLQJGRZQDGDUNVLGHDOOH\7KHVHJPHQWHQGVE\UHWXUQLQJWR
Sarkozy, who, looking up, presumably at a resident  in one of the bleak cement high-rises, 
FRPPHQWV¶<RX·YHKDGHQRXJKKXK"<RX·YHKDGHQRXJKRIWKLVEXQFKRIracaille>VFXP@"
:HOOZH·UHJRLQJWRJHWULGRIWKHPIRU\RX·0XUSK\S
6DUNR]\·V GHVFULSWLRQ RI WKH ¶UDFDLOOH·ZDV SHUFHLYHG DV D GLUHFW LQVXOW E\PDQ\ UHVLGHQWV
compounding the discrimination that permeates life in the suburbs by publicly verbalizing the 
VWLJPDWKDWKDVEHHQDWWDFKHGWRWKHVHDUHDVE\PDLQVWUHDPVRFLHW\+LVFRQWURYHUVLDOVWDWHPHQWV
added to the frustration of the inhabitants of these areas, moving the situation in the suburbs 
towards a context where the potential for civil unrest was markedly increased (Moran, 2012). 
&ǈǇǍƾǇǍǂǈǇ9ǈǅǑ,ǌǌǎƾǑ;ǑǑǑǑɢɠɡǑ
trigger and escalation
Academic and journalistic commentators on the French riots have highlighted a number of 
key dynamic aspects of the disorders, relating to our communication context and interactional 
levels of analysis, that help us to understand how and why they proliferated so widely and with 
such rapid effect beyond their point of instigation. There can be no doubting that it was the 
KLJKO\ HPRWLYH DQG V\PEROLFDOO\ VLJQLÀFDQW LQFLGHQW LQYROYLQJ WKH HOHFWURFXWLRQ RI WKH WZR
youths from Clichy-sous-Bois and the immediate outrage it generated that provided the initial 
¶ÁDVKSRLQW·IRUWKH)UHQFKULRWVRI7KHLQFHQGLDU\HIIHFWRIWKLVLQFLGHQWZDVH[DFHUEDWHG
E\WKHFRQVSLFXRXVDEVHQFHRIDQ\DWWHPSWE\WKHJRYHUQPHQWRUVHFXULW\DXWKRULWLHVWR¶SDFLI\·
the local population via apologetic or conciliatory remarks:
During the hours following the incident the Minister of Interior, Nicolas Sarkozy,  
accused the three youngsters of involvement in a burglary but denied that they had been 
chased... Neither the police nor the government made any gesture of compassion  
or respect towards the grieving parents and relatives of the boys. (Fassin, 2006, p.1)
5RFKp DQG0DLOODUGPDNH WKH UHODWHG SRLQW WKDW KDG0U 6DUNR]\ GHOLEHUDWHO\ ¶VHW RXW WR
LQFUHDVHDOLHQDWLRQDQGGHÀDQFHKHFRXOGQRWKDYHFKRVHQDPRUHHIIHFWLYHWDFWLF·S
7KHIXUWKHUXQLÀFDWLRQDQGDQWDJRQLVPRIQRWRQO\WKHORFDOUHVLGHQWVRI&OLFK\VRXV%RLV
but those of wider communities in Paris and beyond, was provoked by subsequent escalatory 
interventions (both interactional and communicative) on the part of the authorities. A temporary 
optimism that the initial violence may have been abating was aroused when a peaceful march 
E\SHRSOHWRRNSODFHRQWKHQLJKWRI2FWREHU0DQ\RIWKRVHLQYROYHGZRUHWVKLUWV
SURFODLPLQJ¶'HDGIRUQRWKLQJ· LQKRQRXURIWKHWZRER\V0XFFKLHOOL+RZHYHUVXFK
SURJUHVVZDVWKHQQXOOLÀHGRQWKHHYHQLQJRI2FWREHUZKHQWZRRIÀFHUVSXUVXLQJDJURXS
of youths directed a gas grenade into entrance of a mosque where worshippers were saying 
prayers for Ramadan. Scores of those present were forced to evacuate the building for fear of 
DVSK\[LDWLRQ+RZHYHUKHUHWRR0U6DUNR]\UHIXVHGWRFRQFHGHWKDWWKHSROLFHKDGDQ\UHDVRQ
IRUFRQWULWLRQ6FKQHLGHU$V-REDUGSSRLQWVRXWWKLVDWURFLW\¶DFWHGDVD
SRZHUIXOPHFKDQLVPRIERXQGDU\DFWLYDWLRQ·IRVWHULQJDSURQRXQFHG¶XVYHUVXVWKHP·PHQWDOLW\
throughout the length and breadth of French society ( Jobard, 2008, p. 1290).
The move by the French government to impose curfew legislation dating back to the Algerian 
ZDURIKDG\HWDQRWKHULQÁDPPDWRU\UDWKHUWKDQSDFLI\LQJHIIHFW$VRQH\HDUROGIURP
&OLFK\VRXV%RLVFRPSODLQHGWR+HQOH\
On the radio they said the last time they used that law was in the Algerian war. Is that 
VWXSLGRUZKDW"1LQHW\SHUFHQWRIWKHSHRSOHZKROLYHKHUHDUH$UDEV:KDWGRHVWKDWWHOO
WKHP")LIW\\HDUVODWHU\RX·UHVWLOOGLIIHUHQW":H·UHQRWDOORZHGRXWVLGHDQGHYHU\RQHHOVH
LV"
On a larger scale, the use of social media and digital communications played a role in 
DPSOLI\LQJWKHYLROHQFH'XULQJWKHULRWVPRELOHSKRQHXVHZDV¶FLWHGUHSHDWHGO\E\SROLWLFLDQV
mainstream media, and bloggers as the preferred frontline communication medium of the rioters 
and young residents of the banlieues’ (Russell, 2007, p.290). Furthermore, with mainstream media 
OLPLWLQJWKHLUFRYHUDJHRIWKHULRWV²FHUWDLQHGLWRUVDQGMRXUQDOLVWVZHUHZDU\RILQFLWLQJIXUWKHU
YLROHQFHDQGHQFRXUDJLQJVXSSRUWIRUIDUULJKWSROLWLFLDQV²WKRVHZLWKFRPPHQWVDQGRSLQLRQV
turned to online blogs to spread their message (ibid.). A proliferation of information online 
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added to the content of established media outlets and played a role in uniting spatially disparate 
suburban communities, creating what may be described as a sort of virtual community (Moran, 
2012). In this context, young people from banlieues across the nation, sharing similar experiences 
RILQMXVWLFHDQGVLWXDWHGÀUPO\ZLWKLQWKH¶XVYHUVXVWKHP·SDUDGLJPEHFDPHFRQQHFWHGZLWKWKH
original event and gained what they regarded as legitimacy for their violent acts. 
It is evident from the observations of commentators like Roché and Maillard (op. cit.) that 
the problems caused by these inadvertent tendencies to solidify opposition towards the police 
were aggravated by consistent signs of police ineffectualness and disarray, which emboldened the 
ULRWSDUWLFLSDQWVDQGHQFRXUDJHGJUHDWHUYLROHQFH7KHVHDXWKRUVPDLQWDLQLELGSSWKDW
WZRNH\LQVWLWXWLRQDORUJDQLVDWLRQDOIHDWXUHVRIWKHSROLFLQJRIWKHULRWV²LHWKHIDFWWKDWWKH\
were centrally co-ordinated, at the regional (department), rather than the local (circonscription) level, 
DQGWKHIDFWWKDWWKLVLQYROYHGWKH¶VHJPHQWDWLRQ·RISROLFHVHUYLFHVLQWRSXEOLFVHFXULW\IRUFHV
the Compagnies Républicains de SecuritéJHQGDUPHULHPRELOHHWF²SURGXFHGVHULRXVFRQIXVLRQDQG
disorganisation.  Different police units were therefore required to intervene without possessing 
DQ\UHDOLGHDRIWKHLU¶UHFLSURFDOUROHV·RUKDYLQJDQDGHTXDWHNQRZOHGJHRIWKHORFDOSHRSOHRU
WHUULWRU\LQYROYHG.H\VWUDWHJLFVSDFHDQGLQLWLDWLYHZDVWKXVFRQFHGHGWRWKHULRWHUVLELGS
,WZDVRQO\ZKHQWKHGHFLVLRQZDVWDNHQWRWUDQVIHUWDFWLFDOFRPPDQGIURPWKHGHSDUWPHQWV
to local level that the rioting was eventually quelled.  
,QGHSWK LQWHUYLHZVXQGHUWDNHQE\ MRXUQDOLVWV DQG DFDGHPLFV FRQÀUP WKDW WKHPHDQLQJV
and motives attached to the burning and destruction that characterised the riots were linked, 
primarily, to the salient and highly proximate matter of police harassment. Thus, at one level, 
DQJHUDQG¶SURWHVW·ZDVIRFXVVHGERWKRQWKHSROLFHDQGWKHSHUVRQXOWLPDWHO\KHOGUHVSRQVLEOH
for their intensely discriminatory and unacceptable behaviour. In the words of one 18-year-old 
rioter, it was: 
Les keufs, man, the cops. They’re Sarkozy’s and Sarkozy must go, he has to shut his mouth, 
VD\VRUU\RUMXVWIXFNRII+HVKRZVQRUHVSHFW+HFDOOVXVDQLPDOVKHVD\VKH·OOFOHDQWKH
FLWpVZLWKDSRZHUKRVH+H·VPDGHLWZRUVHPDQ(YHU\FDUWKDWJRHVXSWKDW·VRQHPRUH
PHVVDJHIRUKLPTXRWHGE\+HQOH\
Insofar as such individuals were concerned, the spectacle of burning cars provided an 
LGHDOFDPHUDIULHQGO\PHWKRGRI¶JHWWLQJWKHPHVVDJHDFURVVWR6DUNR]\·DQGWKHUHVWRI
French society that such police behaviour had to stop (Duvall Smith, 2005).
The riots were also underpinned by a second, more latent issue: the failure of the state to 
counter the processes of exclusion that have left the population of the suburbs (particularly 
ethnic minorities) marginalised from mainstream society. In this context, there is a strong link 
between the behaviour of the rioters at the interactional level and the broader structural and 
political levels. The riots represented a rejection of their situation by an angry and disillusioned 
population, and it is clear in interviews conducted by Mucchielli that the targets of the rioters’ 
DFWLRQVZHUHKHDYLO\LQÁXHQFHGE\FROOHFWLYHIHHOLQJVRI¶LQMXVWLFHDEDQGRQPHQWDQGUHMHFWLRQ·
:KHQ,VHHVRPHIULHQGVDQGP\ELJEURWKHUZKRKDYHGLSORPDVDQGÀYH\HDUVEH\RQG
KLJKVFKRRODQGWKH\ZRUNLQVXSHUPDUNHWVDVVHFXULW\JXDUGVKRZFUD]\FDQ\RXJHW"
I don’t get it. They got an education, they worked at it, and after that they end up [like 
that], it’s not fair. So you see that school only brings a tough life, in the end. During the 
ULRWV,ZDQWHGWRSDUWLFLSDWHUHDOVHULRXV¶FDXVHWKRVHEDVWDUGVLQVRFLHW\WKH\GRQ·WJLYHD
&ǈǇǍƾǇǍǂǈǇ9ǈǅǑ,ǌǌǎƾǑ;ǑǑǑǑɢɠɡǑ
damn about us, they’re paid tons and tons, and they don’t even do their job of supporting 
problem students. So I’m telling you the truth, I burned some cars near the high school to 
show them that we exist and that we’re not going to let them fuck us over like fuck. (op. 
FLWS
These feelings of abandonment are the product of structural problems that have engendered 
academic failure and unemployment in the banlieues. Inextricably enmeshed among these key 
structural factors is the related issue of political marginalisation. A number of commentators have 
KLJKOLJKWHGWKHSROLWLFDOVLJQLÀFDQFHRIWKHULRWVDUJXLQJWKDWWKHPDMRULW\RISDUWLFLSDQWV
viewed the violence as the only means of making their grievances heard in the political arena 
from which they are excluded (Lapeyronnie, 2006; Moran, 2012). This interpretation is borne 
out by the fact that the violence and destruction was not indiscriminate. Mucchielli (2009) points 
out that 80 per cent of property destroyed was state-owned and included police stations and town 
halls.
the english riots of 2011
%DFNJURXQGFRQGLWLRQV
In order to fully understand the corresponding motives and meanings of the English riots 
of 2011, it is necessary to begin by distinguishing between the relevant predisposing factors in 
English society generally, and those especially relating to the area of north London where the 
rioting initially broke out.
$WWKHWLPHRIWKH(QJOLVKULRWVWKH8.HFRQRP\ZDVVWLOOUHHOLQJIURPWKHHIIHFWVRIWKH
ZRUOGZLGH ¶EDQNLQJ FULVLV·ZKLFKKDG FDWDSXOWHG WKHPDMRUZHVWHUQ VWRFNPDUNHWV LQWRZKDW
.HOOQHUUHIHUVWRDVD¶GRZQZDUGVSLUDOOLQJIUHHIDOO·7KH¶&RDOLWLRQJRYHUQPHQW·SUHVLGHG
over by the Conservative prime minister, David Cameron, had responded to this trauma by 
VXEVFULELQJWRDQ¶DXVWHULW\DJHQGD·SUHGLFDWHGRQUHGXFLQJSXEOLFVHFWRUZHOIDUHDQGHGXFDWLRQ
EXGJHWVZKLFKGLVSURSRUWLRQDWHO\DIIHFWHGWKH\RXQJDQGSRRU²EXWQRWWKHZHDOWKLHVWVHFWLRQRI
British society, including the bankers, whose expensive bonus payments seemed scarcely to have 
been affected (ibid.). Worst affected of all were those poor, ethnic minority communities, like the 
%URDGZDWHU)DUPHVWDWHDQGWKHRWKHU/RQGRQYHQXHVDIIHFWHGE\WKHULRWLQJZKLFKDV6XWWHUOW\
(op. cit.) points out, were all characterised by chronically high levels of youth unemployment, 
failing schools, and poor levels of educational attainment.
,QFXOWXUDOWHUPVWKH¶YRODWLOHDQGDOLHQDWHG\RXQJPHQ·RFFXS\LQJWKHVHFRPPXQLWLHVKDG
DGDSWHGWRWKHLUSUHGLFDPHQWYLD¶FRSLQJPHFKDQLVPV·GHVLJQHGWR¶FRPSHQVDWHIRUWKHIDLOXUHWR
SURYLGHMREVDQGZRUNE\DWWHPSWLQJWRÀQGUHVSHFWWKURXJKDOWHUQDWLYHPHDQVRIWHQWKURXJK
LOOHJDOPHDQV·+DOOVZRUWKDQG%URWKHUWRQS6XFKVWUDWHJLHVKDYHVRPHWLPHVWDNHQ
WKH H[WUHPH IRUPV RI GUXJ GHDOLQJ EXUJODULHV VWUHHW UREEHULHV DQG JDQJUHODWHG FRQÁLFW $V
+DOOVZRUWK DQG %URWKHUWRQ H[SODLQ WKHUH KDYH EHHQ FRUUHVSRQGLQJ SROLWLFDOLGHRORJLFDO
SUHVVXUHVRQWKHSROLFH²LQWKHIRUPRIVXFFHVVLYHPRUDOSDQLFV²WRXUJHQWO\JHWWRJULSVZLWK
FULPLQDO¶FXOWXUDO·DFWLYLWLHVRIWKLVQDWXUH
The ways in which the police recalibrated their policies in response to this enhanced political 
pressure (institutional/organisational level) greatly impacted on contemporary day-to-day police-
community relations (contextual level). The revised police strategy involved an enhanced reliance 
RQVSHFLDOLVW ¶JXQFULPH·DQGVXUYHLOODQFHXQLWVFRPELQHGZLWKDJUHDWHUGD\WRGD\HPSKDVLV
RQ ¶VWRSSLQJ DQG VHDUFKLQJ· ORFDO UHVLGHQWVZKRP WKH\ UHJDUGHGZLWK VXVSLFLRQ GHVLJQDWHG D
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PRUHSURPLQHQWUROHIRU2SHUDWLRQ7ULGHQWDQGHQFRXUDJHGLQFUHDVLQJO\PRUHSHUYDVLYH¶VWRS
DQGVHDUFK·SURFHGXUHV²LQYDULDEO\FDUULHGRXWE\RIÀFHUVIURPRXWVLGHWKHORFDOLW\:LGHVSUHDG
complaints that the latter approach was dangerously indiscriminate were substantiated by 
VWDWLVWLFDOHYLGHQFHWKDWRIWKHVWRSVFDUULHGRXWE\SROLFHRIÀFHUVLQ7RWWHQKDPDQGWKH
VXUURXQGLQJDUHDRI+DULQJH\EHWZHHQ$SULODQG-XQHRQO\UHVXOWHGLQFRQYLFWLRQV
But it was not just the quantity of stop and searches that became the issue. It was the manner 
in which these searches were conducted. There was a strong and shared sense of being treated 
unfairly and without due respect. This generated a sense of grievance and of anger (Reicher and 
6WRWWS
Similar alienation and antagonism resulted from the deployment of specialist units (Riots 
&RPPXQLWLHVDQG9LFWLPV3DQHO ,W LV LQGLFDWLYHRI WKH ¶GLVWDQW·\HWSHUYDVLYHQDWXUHRI
VXFKSHUVRQQHOWKDWRQWKHRFFDVLRQRI0DUN'XJJDQ·VDUUHVW7ULGHQWRIÀFHUVZHUHDFFRPSDQLHG
E\DUPHGRIÀFHUVIURP&WKH0366SHFLDOLVW)LUHDUP&RPPDQGDQGDUPHGVXUYHLOODQFH
RIÀFHUVIURP6&'WKHIRUFH6XUYHLOODQFH&RPPDQGLQDQRSHUDWLRQ¶WKDWFURVVHGDQXPEHU
of North London boroughs’ (MPS, 2012, p. 20). Also fuelling local community anger was the 
spiralling resentment and distrust resulting from a recent history of deaths relating to police 
raids or detention in police custody, of which the shooting of Mark Duggan was merely the latest 
example (Riots Communities and Victims Panel, 2011). Earlier in the year, on 15 March, a protest 
had taken place outside of the MPS’s headquarters at Scotland Yard, where speakers referred to 
¶HYHU\GD\H[SHULHQFHVRIKDUDVVPHQWEHDWLQJVDQGXQH[SODLQHGGHDWKV·DQGZDUQHGWKHSROLFH
and politicians of impending unrest (Reicher and Stott, op. cit.).  
&RQWUDU\ WR SRSXODU DVVXPSWLRQ WKH NLOOLQJ RI0DUN'XJJDQZDV QRW WKH ÁDVKSRLQW RI
WKHULRW5DWKHU LWPDGHDKLJKO\VLJQLÀFDQWFRQWULEXWLRQWRDFRPPXQLFDWLRQFRQWH[WPDUNHG
by intensifying hostility. This state of affairs was inadvertently compounded by the fact that, 
following Duggan’s death, his case was immediately referred (in line with an MPS standard 
operating procedure) to the Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC), for the purpose 
of investigation. This process required that any formal narrative of events would be withheld, 
pending the outcome of inquiry.  A few leaked comments from within the MPS aside, the lack of 
a formal explanation of events led to intense speculation that the police had something sinister to 
KLGH²LQFOXGLQJWKHSRVVLELOLW\WKDW'XJJDQKDGEHHQGHOLEHUDWHO\¶DVVDVVLQDWHG·036RSFLW,W
ZDVLQUHVSRQVHWRWKLVFRPPXQLFDWLRQGHÀFLWWKDWWKHFROOHFWLYHGHFLVLRQZDVDUULYHGDWWRVWDJH
DSURWHVWPDUFKDQG¶YLJLO·RXWVLGHWKHORFDOSROLFHVWDWLRQ²DVFOHDUD¶WDUJHWRIGHULVLRQ·DVFRXOG
HYHUEHLPDJLQHGLQWKHVHYHU\GLIÀFXOWFLUFXPVWDQFHV
trigger and escalation
A correspondent of the British Guardian newspaper explained how the 200-strong protest 
DVVXPHGWKHFKDUDFWHURID ORQJHVWDEOLVKHGULWXDO ¶:KHQVRPHWKLQJEDGRFFXUVDIIHFWLQJWKH
IUDJLOHUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQWKHSROLFHDQGWKHEODFNFRPPXQLW\LQ7RWWHQKDP²DFRQWURYHUVLDO
DUUHVWDGHDWKLQFXVWRG\²SHRSOHPDUFKIURPWKHHVWDWHVWRWKHSROLFHVWDWLRQ0XLU,Q
NHHSLQJZLWKWKLVWUDGLWLRQWKHPDUFKSURJUHVVHGDFFRUGLQJWR¶WH[WERRNGHVLJQ·ZLWKZRPHQ
DQGFKLOGUHQWDNLQJWKHOHDG7KHSROLFHKDGEHHQJLYHQDGYDQFHQRWLÀFDWLRQDVSHUXVXDODQG
Muir describes how the protest showed all the customary precision of a well-practised dance 
URXWLQHH[FHSWWKDW¶2Q6DWXUGD\$XJXVWWKHFKRUHRJUDSK\ZHQWEDGO\DZU\·
7KH SUHVFULEHG VWHSV LQ WKLV ZHOOUHKHDUVHG ¶SDWWHUQ RI DFFRPPRGDWLRQ· UHTXLUHG WKDW
SURWHVWRUJDQLVHUVZRXOGEHZHOFRPHGLQWRWKHVWDWLRQE\DQDSSURSULDWHO\KLJKUDQNLQJRIÀFHU
(generally, of superintendent level or above), who would grant them an adequate opportunity 
to frankly discuss their grievances. This time, though, the leaders of the march were initially 
&ǈǇǍƾǇǍǂǈǇ9ǈǅǑ,ǌǌǎƾǑ;ǑǑǑǑɢɠɡǑ
informed them there was no possibility of their being allowed to discuss the matter as it was 
QRZLQWKHKDQGVRIWKH,3&&7KH\ZHUHDOVRWROGWKDWLQDQ\FDVHWKHUHOHYDQWVHQLRURIÀFHUV
were currently unavailable, having been deployed at a nearby Premier League football match 
DW:KLWH+DUW/DQH$&KLHI,QVSHFWRUZDVHYHQWXDOO\EURXJKWLQEXWWKLVVWLOOIDLOHGWRVDWLVI\
WKHSURWHVWHUVZKRZHUHDGDPDQWWKDWDPRUHVHQLRURIÀFHUVKRXOGDWOHDVWVKRZWKHFRXUWHV\
RIDGGUHVVLQJ'XJJDQ·V IDPLO\8OWLPDWHO\ WKHFDOOZDVVHQWRXWIRUDVXSHULQWHQGHQW WRPDNH
a special visit to the station, but he or she had not managed to arrive by the time that most 
protesters decided to leave in frustrated fashion a matter of two hours later. This perceived 
¶EUHDNGRZQRIDFFRPPRGDWLRQ·ZDVSLYRWDOWRWKHULRW·VLPPHGLDWHHVFDODWLRQ,WZDVMXVWDVWKH
ODVWRIWKHLUQXPEHUZHUHGHSDUWLQJWKDWWKHÀUVWVLJQVRIGLVRUGHUHPHUJHGLELG
Police accounts maintained that the trigger for this disorder was the action of a group of local 
youths who, incensed by the apparent police indifference towards the march, began throwing 
PLVVLOHV DWSDUNHGXSSROLFHFDUV DQGVHHPHG LQWHQWRQ VWRUPLQJ WKH VWDWLRQ LELG+RZHYHU
5HLFKHUDQG6WRWWSLQVLVWWKDWWKHDFWXDO¶ÁDVKSRLQW·RFFXUUHGLQWKHFRXUVHRIDSROLFH
DWWHPSWWRGLVSHUVHZKDWUHPDLQHGRIWKHGHSDUWLQJFURZGWKHUHE\FUHDWLQJD¶VWHULOH]RQH·WRWKH
north and south of the station. It was at this point that they allegedly bundled a 16-year-old black 
woman to the ground and began hitting her repeatedly.   
Eye-witnesses quoted by Lewis (2011) agree that the incident occurred when the woman 
angrily stepped forward in remonstration:   
>2QHPDQ@ZKRZDVLQDQHDUE\FKXUFKGHVFULEHGVHHLQJWKHJLUOWKURZD OHDÁHWDQG
ZKDWPD\KDYHEHHQDVWRQHDWSROLFH>+H@VDLGWKHJLUOZDVWKHQ´SRXQGHGE\ULRW
VKLHOGVµ´6KHZHQWGRZQRQWKHÁRRUEXWRQFHVKHPDQDJHGWRJHWXSVKHZDVKLWDJDLQ
before being half-dragged away by her friend.”
An elderly woman quoted by Brown added that, from where she was standing, just behind 
WKHJLUO¶,VDZWKHSROLFHPDQOLIWKLVÀVWDQGSXQFKKHUULJKWLQKHUPRXWKDVKHGLGWKDW,UDQ
RYHUWRKHUDQGKHUPRXWKZDVEOHHGLQJDQGIURPZKHQWKDWÀVWKLWWKHJLUOWKHULRWVVWDUWHG·
7KLVYHUVLRQLVHQGRUVHGE\5HLFKHUDQG6WRWWZKRHPSKDVLVHKRZ¶$OOWKRVHZKRGHVFULEHWKH
LQFLGHQW DJUHH WKDW WKLV ZDV ZKDW DFWXDOO\ ¶VSDUNHG RII DOO WKH ULRWV· RS FLW SS  7KH
¶LQWHQVLI\LQJ·IDFWWKDWWKHSROLFH¶YLFWLP·ZDVOLWWOHPRUHWKDQDJLUOXQGRXEWHGO\UHLQIRUFHGWKH
incident’s catalytic value.  
Ensuing processes of interaction quickly contributed to the proliferation of disorder. The 
instantaneous transmission via word of mouth and social media of rumours that the police had 
DWWDFNHGDJLUOSURYHGPDVVLYHO\LQFHQGLDU\7KXVDV/HZLVH[SODLQV¶,QD<RX7XEHFOLSVKRZLQJ
burning police cars and violent pitched battles more than an hour later, a rioter can be heard 
JRDGLQJRWKHUV´'LGQ·W\RXVHHWKHJLUOJHWWLQJURXJKHGE\WKH)HGVPDQ"&RPHRQµ·9HUVLRQV
of the incident were soon alleging that the girl in question was only 10-years-old, or that she 
was carrying a child (Brown, op. cit.).  Further impetus was given to the rioting when the video 
went viral one day later (ibid.). It is evident that social media discussion of this nature, linking 
the police killing of Mark Duggan and their abuse of the teenage girl to wider perceptions of 
LQMXVWLFHSOD\HGDNH\UROHLQWKHHVFDODWLRQRIWKHULRWV²FUHDWLQJDKLJKO\¶FRPEXVWLEOH·QDWLRQZLGH
communication context and enhanced feelings of opposition and solidarity:
A notable effect of new social media was that these mediums engendered a sense of social 
cohesion by connecting actors from disparate geographies into a common symbolic space. 
While new social media did not initiate the unrest, by representing one man’s death as 
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DYLYLGV\PERORIZLGHVSUHDGVRFLDO LQMXVWLFHZKDW,UHIHUWRDVD ¶VRFLDOWUDJHG\·WKHVH
emergent mediums played a key role in facilitating the events, (Baker, 2012, pp. 175-6)
.H\LQVWLWXWLRQDORUJDQLVDWLRQDOIDFWRUVFRQWLQXHGWRKDYHDEHDULQJRQHYHQWV7KH036·V
own review of the riots (MPS, 2012) recognises that the inadequacy of the force’s early response 
to disorder played a crucial role in its subsequent escalation.  Factors residing at the institutional/
RUJDQLVDWLRQDO OHYHODUH LPSRUWDQW WRRXUXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIZK\ WKLVZDV WKHFDVH8SSHUPRVW
DPRQJWKHVHZDVWKHIDFWWKDWWKHNH\¶6HUYLFH0RELOLVDWLRQ3ODQ·UHTXLULQJDOOIRUFHERURXJKVWR
XUJHQWO\SURYLGHSXEOLFRUGHUWUDLQHGRIÀFHUVDWWLPHVRI¶KHLJKWHQHGGHPDQG·ZDVQRWSURSHUO\
LPSOHPHQWHGLELGS'XHWRKXPDQHUURUDQ ¶$PEHUPHVVDJH·ZDVVHQWRXWWRERURXJK
commanders, asking them merely to identify available resources, when the gravity of the situation 
UHDOO\ ZDUUDQWHG D ¶5HGPHVVDJH· GHPDQGLQJ WKH LPPHGLDWH PRELOLVDWLRQ RI UHVRXUFHV 7KLV
RYHUVLJKWVXEVHTXHQWO\EHFDPHDSSDUHQWDQGZDVTXLFNO\DFWHGXSRQ+RZHYHUWKH036UHSRUW
DFFHSWVWKDWWKHQHWHIIHFWZDVWKDW¶WKHQXPEHURIRIÀFHUVZDVQRW>LQLWLDOO\@HQRXJKDQGWKH\GLG
not arrive quickly enough to deal with the speed with which the violence escalated’ (ibid). 
In the riot’s early stages, participants appeared to respond to the evidence of their own eyes 
(i.e. at the interactional level) that the police were too few in number, and too disorganised to 
UHVLVWE\EUHDNLQJWKURXJKSROLFHOLQHVDQGVHWWLQJÀUHWRWKHLUYHKLFOHV5LRWV&RPPXQLWLHVDQG
Victims Panel (2011). Thereafter, social media appears to have played another important role in 
WKHULRWV²E\KLJKOLJKWLQJWKHSROLFH·VLQDELOLW\WRDGHTXDWHO\FRSHZLWKWKHYLROHQFHORRWLQJDQG
destruction. Thus:
$WÀUVWWKHEHOLHIWKDWWKHSROLFHZRXOGQRWEHDEOHWRVWRSULRWLQJLQFLGHQWVZDV
relatively localised to the London area. Riots on Sunday 7 August were within an 
18km radius of Tottenham. Those who rioted on Sunday were again felt to have been 
XQFKDOOHQJHGDQGFRQÀGHQFHDPRQJSRWHQWLDOULRWHUVLQRWKHUSDUWVRIWKHFRXQWU\JUHZ
%\0RQGD\ULRWVKDGVSUHDGQDWLRQDOO\LELGS
Like their French counterparts, the vast majority of participants in the English disorders 
attributed their involvement to poor police-community relations. When asked afterwards what 
KDGEHHQWKHLUPDLQPRWLYHVIRUHQJDJLQJLQWKHULRWVRIUHVSRQGHQWVLQWKH¶5HDGLQJWKH
5LRWV·VXUYH\*XDUGLDQ/6(UHIHUUHGWRDGHVLUHWRH[DFWUHYHQJHRQWKHSROLFHIRU¶DOO
WKHJULHIWKH\KDYHFDXVHGWRFRPPXQLWLHV·7KHVXUYH\IXUWKHUUHYHDOVWKDW¶ORRWLQJ·ZDVQRWDQ
activity engaged in by the vast majority of people involved, thereby undermining, as Platts-Fowler 
SSXWVLWWKH¶H[SODQDWRU\SRZHURISHUVRQDOJUHHGRUFRQVXPHULVP·6KHVKDUHVWKH
YLHZRIFRPPHQWDWRUVOLNH5HLFKHUDQG6WRWWRSFLWDQG6XWWHUOW\RSFLWWKDWDQ\PDWHULDO
EHQHÀWVUHVXOWLQJIURPVXFKEHKDYLRXUZHUHVHFRQGDU\LQLPSRUWDQFHWRWKHSULPDU\GHVLUHWR
¶WHDFKWKHSROLFHDOHVVRQ·DQGGHPRQVWUDWHWKDWWKH\ZHUHQRORQJHULQFRQWURO$V5HLFKHUDQG
6WRWWSRLQWRXW¶7KHSOHDVXUHWKDWSHRSOHJRWIURPGRLQJVRZDVSDOSDEOH·RSFLWS
This is not to suggest that all such behaviour was directed universally at the police.  Structural 
factors were clearly of crucial importance. The post-riot interviews carried out by the authors of 
the Riots, Communities and Victims Panel report, re-emphasised the feelings of hopelessness 
and political marginalisation experienced by contemporary English youth: 
In our visits to many deprived areas, we observed a sense of hopelessness. Many young 
people we met felt that goals many people take for granted such as getting a job or going 
to college or university were unachievable for them. They believed that they were bearing 
&ǈǇǍƾǇǍǂǈǇ9ǈǅǑ,ǌǌǎƾǑ;ǑǑǑǑɢɠɡǑ
the brunt of cuts caused by irresponsible bankers who had enriched  themselves at the 
FRVWRIRWKHUV¶7KHUHDUHGRXEOHVWDQGDUGVLQPRUDOLW\·DQGZHUHELWWHUDERXWWKHULVHLQ
tuition fees and the removal of the Educational Maintenance Allowance. (2011, p. 102)
Reicher and Stott’s extremely nuanced overview and analysis of the disorders does much 
WRUHFRPPHQGWKHQRWLRQRI ¶VDWHOOLWH· ULRWVRFFXUULQJ LQ WKHZDNHEXWEH\RQGWKH LPPHGLDWH
ORFDWLRQRIWKHLQLWLDORXWEUHDNRIFRQÁLFW$VSUHGLFWHGE\2WWHQHWDORSFLWWKHVHVHFRQGDU\
disturbances varied in the nature of their instigation, and revealed contrasting emphases on the 
XQGHUO\LQJLVVXHV LQYROYHG7KXVIRUH[DPSOHWKHHQVXLQJGLVRUGHU LQ+DFNQH\ZDVWULJJHUHG
E\ DQ HQFRXQWHU EHWZHHQ D EODFN \RXWK DQG SROLFH RIÀFHUV ZKLFK FU\VWDOOLVHG ORQJVWDQGLQJ
antagonism between the police and local residents. It seems likely that, by contrast, the apparently 
XQSURYRNHGDQG¶JOHHIXO·DWWDFNVRQSHRSOHDQGSURSHUW\RFFXUULQJLQWKHPRUHDIÁXHQW/RQGRQ
VXEXUEVRI&UR\GRQDQG(DOLQJZHUHDUHÁHFWLRQRIWKHSHUFHLYHGDXVWHULW\PHDVXUHVDQGSROLWLFDO
hypocrisy impacting on the younger generation.
Conclusion
While some academic studies have sought to comparatively analyse the French riots of 2005 
with those that occurred in England in 2011, these have been limited in their scope and depth. 
In the above discussion, we set out a more comprehensive analysis of these episodes of collective 
disorder through the application of the Flashpoints Model of Public Disorder. This approach 
allows us to engage with both the background causes (long- and short-term) that facilitated 
WKHEXLOGXSRIDSURIRXQGDQJHUDQGIUXVWUDWLRQDQGWKH¶WULJJHULQJ·HYHQWWKDWSURPSWHGWKLV
latent potential for violence to take form in the riots. In this context, a number of important 
FRPPRQDOLWLHVFDQEHLGHQWLÀHGDFURVVWKHHYHQWVXQGHUVWXG\
First, comparison of the French and English riots reveals that in both cases, the disorder 
took place in contexts characterised by economic deprivation and long-term social decline. 
7KLVÀQGLQJUHLQIRUFHVSUHYLRXVUHVHDUFKE\WKHVHFRQGDXWKRULQWRWKHFDXVHVRIULRWLQJLQWKH
8QLWHG.LQJGRPDQG)UDQFHVLQFHWKHV.LQJDQG:DGGLQJWRQDQGUHYHDOVDZHOO
established pattern of social exclusion and political marginalisation in both contexts. 
6HFRQG SRRU SROLFHSXEOLF UHODWLRQV UHSUHVHQWHG DQ LPSRUWDQW IDFWRU LQÁXHQFLQJ WKH
outbreak and subsequent escalation of the riots. In both England and France, the police are 
YLHZHGLQWHUPVRIDQ¶XVYHUVXVWKHP·RSSRVLWLRQLQWKRVHDUHDVDIIHFWHGE\FROOHFWLYHGLVRUGHU
This opposition has been reinforced by incidents arising from the often humiliating controles 
d’identites LQ)UDQFHDQGWKH LQWUXVLYH ¶VWRSDQGVHDUFK·SURFHGXUHV LQ(QJODQG)XUWKHUPRUHD
track record of police discrimination and violence in both cases has led to the construction of 
an interpretative framework that positions the young people of deprived areas as victims. This 
UHLQIRUFHVWKH¶XVYHUVXVWKHP·SDUDGLJPDQGJLYHVOHJLWLPDF\WRDQ\UHODWHGGLVRUGHU,Q)UDQFH
for example, almost every episode of rioting in the banlieues since the 1980s has been triggered 
by the injury or death of a local resident in an incident involving police. This collective memory 
serves as a powerful lens through which each new episode of police violence (real or perceived) is 
viewed and contributes greatly to creating a context that is conducive to disorder.
Third, while the riots themselves were triggered by a particularly emotive event, the violence 
was escalated by the immediate communicative response of the state. In both cases, poor or 
inaccurate communication in the wake of the respective tragedies was interpreted as either a 
lack of respect or a sign that the authorities were attempting to shirk any causal responsibility for 
events. In the French case, Nicolas Sarkozy incorrectly accused the youngsters of involvement in 
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a burglary and absolved the police of any blame, while in the English case the refusal to provide 
a formal explanation of events (the fact that this was due to the requirements of the Independent 
Police Complaints Commission (IPCC) inquiry was lost on protesters) prompted speculation of 
a cover-up by the authorities. 
Fourth, social media and digital communications appear to have contributed to the escalation 
of the violence. In both France and England, these media played a unifying role by providing a 
virtual space for communication and information dissemination amongst relevant young people. 
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